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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General
of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-v-

OMAR B. BUNNELL; SAMUEL J.
TAYLOR; RAY M. HARDING; and
JOHN E. SMITH, individually and as
members of the Thirty-Seventh Utah
State Legislature, c:omprising the Joint
Legal Services Committee,

Case No.

11917

Defendants and Appollants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action that was brought by the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, seeking to have declared
unconstitutional the provisions of Section 36-8-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. This section provided that members of
the Joint Legal Services Committee of the Utah State
Legislature \Vere to receive a per diem payment of $25.00
)Jer day and reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses incurred while attending meetings of that Committee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the respondent's motion for
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summary judgment, finding such payments to the Joint
Legal Services Committee to be unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's decision and a determination that Section 36-8-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is constitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 37th Legislature for the State of Utah enacted as
Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 181 that which has been codified as Section 36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Irt reads
,as follows:
"Members of the committee shall he paid a per
diem of $25 per day and shall be reimbursed for
actual and necessary expenses incurred while attending committee meetings."
Thereafter the resrlondent commenced this action in hi$
official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of
Utah, contending that this Section was in violation of both
Sections 7 and 9 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution,
the result of which was the above-described decision of the
trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHEN CONSIDERING SECTION 36-8-6, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, FOR POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFECTS, ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY IS PRESUMED.

A fundamental precept regarding the constitutionality
of legislative acts is that such acts are presumed to be valid
and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality. No act should be declared unconstitutional unless
it is clearly and palpably unconstitutional. This principle
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hns been lcng enunciated and followed in decisions in this

jurisdiction ;:i_s well as elsewhe1·e in the United States.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickly, et al., 28 Utah
215, 78 Pac. 296 (19-04); StiUma11, rt al. v. Lynch, 56 Utah
G40, 192 Pac. 272 (1920); Tintic Standard Mining Co. v.
Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P. 2d 633 (1932); Norville
r. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937 (1940);
Pm-lcinson u. Watson, 4 U. 2d 191, 291 P. 2d ,mo (1955);
Wood v. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d 516 (1962); Great
Salt Lake Author1.ty 'V. Island Ranching Co., 18 U. 2d 45,
414 P. 2d 9,63 (1966).
POINT II
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 181 (CHAPTER 73,
LAWS OF UT AH 1967) WHICH BECAl\IE CODIFIED AS
SECTION 36-8-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS NOT
IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 7, OF THE UT AH CONSTITUTION.

Section 2 of Sende Bill No. 181 (Chapter 73, Laws of
Utah 1967, which became codified as Section 36-8-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, was ena0ted by the 37rth Legislature
to read as follows:
"Members of the committee shall be paid a per
diem of $25 per day and shall be reimbursed for
actual and necessary expenses incurred while attending committee meetings."
At that time Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution
read as follows:
"No member of the Legislature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed
or elected to any civil office of profit under this
State, which shall have been created, or the emolu-
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ments of which shall have been increased, during
the term for which he was elected."
A. ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PRESCRIBES CONSTITUTIONAL DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE THAT ARE TO BE NARROWLY CON-

STRUED IN FAVOR OF ELIGIBILITY.

Utah is not unique in having a provision in its Constitution like Section 7 of Article VI, for nearly all of the
other states have almost identical provisions in their constitutions. One of the important questions posed by each
such provision is what public positions are within the scope
of the prohibition it contains. In its construction there has
arisen a general rule that provisions such as this will be
strictly construed and not extended beyond the office named
as being prohibited and fo.rtl12r will be
construed in fayor of eligibi1ity. Grngg 'C. Dudlry, 143 Okla.
381, 389 Pac. 254 (] 930); State 1'.:; ffl. J oh;1 s.an 1). Nye,
148 Wis. 659, 135 N.W. 126 (1912); W(h!1ace v. Grubb,
154 Tenn. 655, 289 S.W. 530 (1926); 118 A.L.R. 182, 184.
If it were otherwise held, such provisions could very well
deny to members of any legislature the right to serve on
any interim committee it might create from time to time.
This would, in view of the ever greater usage of interim
committees in aid of legislation, serve to grossly th wart the
legislative process.
B. A LEGISLATOR WHO MAY BE APPOINTED TO
THE JOINT LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE IS NOT AP-

POINTED

TO

A

"CIVIL

OFFICE

OF

PROFIT" UNDER

ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7, OF THE UT AH CONSTITUTION.

In many instances the most important inquiries when
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construing constitutional provisions like Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution hnve been as to whether
the prohibited office was created or the emoluments were
increased during the term of the legis'lator involved. This is
not so in tfu.ia case, for here the critical question is whether
a legislator appointed to the Joint Legal Services Committee was appointed to a "civil office of profit" as contemplated by this Section. Many of the cases dealing with
this make distinctions between what is termed a mere employment, which is allowed, and a rmblic or civil office,
which is not. If the offke involves a delegation of some of
the sovereign functions of government to be exercised for
the public welfare, then it is considered a public or civil
office and within the constitutional prohibition. In Re
Opinion of Justices, 3 Me. 481 (1822); State Tax Commission 1J. Harrington, 126 Md. 157, 94 A. 537 (1915); Baird
'V. Lefor, 52 N.D. 155, 201 N.W. 997 (1924); Curtin v. State,
61 Cal. App. 377, 214 Pac. 1030 (1923); 53 A.L.R. 583, 602;
118 A.L.R. 182, 187.
Of more precise definition as to what constitutes a
public or civil office under such constitutional provisions is
State ex rel. Br,.rney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 Pac.
411, 418 (1927) where the Montana Supreme Court stated
as follows:
" ... we hold that five elements are indispensable in any position of public employment, in order
to make it a public office of a civil nature: (1) It
must be created by the Constitution or by the Legislature or created by a municipality or other body
through authority conferred by the Legislature; (2)
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it must possess a delegation of a portion of the
sovereign power of government, to be exercised for
the benefit of the public; (3) the powers conferred
and the duties to be discharged, must be defined,'
directly or impliedly, by the Legislature or through
legislative authority; ( 4) the duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power, other than the law, unless they he
those of an inferior or subordinate office, created or
authorized by the Legislature, and by it placed
under the general control of a superior officer or
body; ( 5) it must have some permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary or occasional."
At the time this decision was handed down, Section 7 of
Article V of the Montana Constitution read in part as
follows:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the
term for which he shall have been elected, be appointed to any civil office under this state ... "
These requisites for an offiice to be characterized as a public
or civil office under such constitutional provisions have been
adopted in other leading cases in the area. State ex rel.
Mcintosh v. Hutchinson, 187 Wash 61, 59 P. 2d 1117
(1936) ; State ex rel. H ambilen 1;. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68,
185 P. 2d 723 ( 1947); Oceanographic Commission v.
O'-Brien, ______ Wash. ______ , 447 P. 2d 707 (1968). When
these cases were handed down, Article II, Semon 13 of
the Washington Constitution read as follows :
"No member of the legislature, during the term
for which he is elected, shall be appointed or elected
to any civil office in the state, which shall have been
created, or the emoluments of which shall have been
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increased, during the term for which he was
elected."

All of the five elements, these cases reiterate, must be
present for the office involved to achieve such sb1ture, and
if any are missing, then it is not a civil or public office as
to \vhich the constitutional disqualification applies.
An analysis of the duties and functions of the Joint
Legal Services Committee reveals that under Chapter 8 of
Title 36, it concerns itself i1rimarily with considering and
investigating, in conjunction with a member of the staff
of the Attorney General of Utah, various legal problems
that confront the Utah State Legislature and making recommendations in these regards to the Legislature and its
various other committees. This results in many instances
in the preparation of proposed legislation for these committees and for the Legislature to consider. It also seeks
to coordinate similar activities being carried on by various
committees of the Legislature but has no precise power to
implement this. The Joint Legal Services Committee has
no power, moreover, to place its findings and recommendations in effect. I ts duties and functions, therefore, are
restricted to that which is investigative and advisory.
If the five requisites set forth in State ex rel. Barney

r. Hawkins, supra, are applied to the Joint Legal Services
Committee and its members, it appears that they cannot
possibly fulfill very many of them. Of these, the first and
third requisites are ones that can probably be met: The
Committee was very assuredly created by the Utah State
Legislature, thus fulfilling the first; and its functions and
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duties have been defined by this Legislature, thus fulfilling
the third requisite. There are grave doubts as to vvhether
the fourth and fifth requisites can be met: in that the
Committee works closely with the Legislature, being subject to its close control and supervision, and cannot fol'
this reason be said to possess the required independence;
and in the fact that the membership of the Committee is
changed every two years, at the end of every General Session of the Legislature, lacking, therefore, the continuity
and permanency required.
The second requisite, furthermore, appears to be an
even more insurmountable barrier to characterizing a member of the Joint Legal Services Committee as one occupying a civil office of profit. It is whether the membership
of this Committee possess any delegaition of the sovereign
power of government. For these members to have this
power they must be engaged in making laws or in executing
or administering the same. Of this particular requisite the
Washington Supreme Court has said:
"However broadly or particularly the term
sovereign power may be defined, it is certain that,
among other attributes, it embraces an exercise of
the government's inherent police power, which, in
turn, and by ordinHy definition, extends to the
preservation of the public health, safety and morals.
" Oceanographic Commission v. O'Brien, ----Wash. ______ , 447 P. 2d 707, 711 (1968)
With the Joint Legal Services Committee being restricted
to investigative and advisory functions, it cannot be said
to possess such deleg;:iticn of sovereign power.
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While there appear to be ;in c<-1ses
deal precisely
with a legislative committee like the Joint Legal Services
Committee in the context of the constitutional disqualificat10;1 provided for in Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah
Constitution, there have been cases from various jurisdictions that have held under similar constitutional prohibitions that membership in various legislative committees
was not a public or civil office. This was the decision in
State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, supra, where membership
in the legislative council of Washington was attacked upon
these constitutional grounds. There the Court said:
"The council members will not legislate, execute, or administer laws enacted by them. The only
power of the legislative council is to collect information and report as to the facts it finds to the
11ext legislature and to make its reports public.
Since it is not engag·ed in making laws, executir.g
them, or administering them, no member of the
council is a holder of a public office ... " State ex
rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68, 76, 185 P. 2d
723, 728 (1947)

1'

This was also the holding in another leading case involving
membership in a legislative council where the Montana
Su1ffeme Court held that the members of this council had
not been appointed thereby to a civil office in contravention
of Article V, Section 7, of the Montana Constitution earlier
quoted. Stntr ex rel. Jamr,s v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120,
814 P. 2d 849 (1957). Yet another case is Parker v. Riley,
18 Cal. 2d 83, 113 P. 2d 873 (1941) in which the California
Supreme Court held that membership by legislators on a
.ioint committee on interstate cooperation that the Cali-
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fornia State Legislature Ind cre<ited by sLtute did not
violate a more restrictive constitutional provision than Article VI, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The California
constitutional provision prohibited any legisbtor from accepting any office, trust, or employment under that state,
'"hich was much more restrictive than the previous constitutional provision in California, this former provision
being very close to Section 7; and membership on this
committee, which was fornw<l to further pm-ticipation of
that state in the council of state governments and cooperation with other governments ,was determined as not being
in violation of the then effective constitutional prohibition.
Thus, the appellant respectfully submits thnt <m appointment or election of a member of the Utah State Legislature
to the Joint Legal Services Committee is not an appointment or election to a "civil office of profit" prohibited by
Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution.
POINT III
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 181 (CHAPTER 73,
LAWS OF UTAH 1967) WHICH BECAME CODIFIED AS
SECTION 36-8-6, UT AH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES
NOT INCREASE THE COMPENSATION OF LEGISLATORS
APPOINTED TO THE JOINT LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI. SECTION 9, OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.

When Section 36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was
enacted in 1967, Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Consti-

"The members of the Legislature shall receive
such compensation ,not exceeding $500.00 a yc::ir
for th: ic;:islatiH·
$.;.oo
cl:t:,: expe :ses
1
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while actually in session, and mileag·e as provided
by law."
Prior to January 1, 1945, this Section 9 read as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive
such per diem and mileage as the Legislature may
provide, not exceeding four dollars per day, and
ten cents per mile for the distance traveled going
to and returning from the place of meeting on the
most usual route, and they shall receive no other
pay or perquisite."
Between J[tnuary 1, 1945, and January 1, 1951, this Section 9 read as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive
snch compensation and mileage as the Legislature
may provide, not exceeding $300.00 per year, and
ten cents per mile for the distance traveled going
to and returning from the place of meeting in the
most usual route, and they shall receive no other
pay or perquisite."
Then on January 1, 1951, this Seotion 9 became what it
was when Section 36-8-6 was enacted. It should be noted
that both of the earlier vensions of this section of the Utah
Constitution stated specifically that "they shall receive no
other pay or perquisite."
The deletion of this latter clause from Article VI,
Section 9, of the Utah Constitution must be construed as
purposeful, and as such leads to some very important conclusions. A "perquisite" is normally defined as emoluments
or profits accruing to a public officer beyond the salary
payable to him. It is an allowance that is paid in addition
to ordinary salary or fixed wages for services rendered, an
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addition to fixed compensation. Ballenthie's Law Dictionary, Thfrd Edition, 939; 43 Am. Jnr., Public Officers
'
§ 359; County Auditors v. Anderson, 133 Pa. Super. 475,
3 A. 2d 28 (1938); State ex rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, 68
Ohio App. 189, 36 N.E. 2d 500 ( 1938). By this deletion
there arises the very strong implication that restrictions
against certain types of remuneration for legislators were
being removed and that some degree of extra pay or perquisite was being authorized in certain instances in addition
to the compensation precisely set forth in Section 9.
This is made more apparent if this deletion is placed
into the context of the then (and now) ever-increasing complexity of state government and the rise of interim legislative committees to act as fact-finders and to make recommendations to the particular legislature to which they were
connected. These functions entailed on behalf of the members of such committees considerable expenditure of time
and effort as well as out-of-pocket expense. The services
rendered in such interim tasks constitute extraordinary
services, being in addition to those rendered during or
incident to the sessions of the legislature involved. It is
only reasonable that legislators serving on these committees
receive some modicum of compensation for their extraordinary services rendered and expenses. It would appear,
moreover, that the electorate of Utah in 1944 and again in
1949, in deleting the prohibition against other pay or perquisites for legislators, intended that where members of
the Utah State Legislature performed services and incurred
expenses for legislative purposes in addition to those during
a session, such members should be compensated for this.
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Today the legislative process includes a great deal of extra
effort and expense between sessions of the Legislature by
the members of various interim committees, such as the
,Joint Legal Services Committee, the membership as to
which include only a portion of all the legislators. To deny
the members of these committees the right to a small
measure of compensation for their services in these capacities and their expenses seem grossly unreasonable and
would, most assuredly, serve to frustrate the legislative
process. It certainly cannot be denied that the framers of
the Utah Constitution and those who by vote since then
have changed it did not intend to frustrate this process.
The strong policy considerations for permitting payment
of the very reasonable amounts provided for in Section
36-8-6, Uta:h Code Annotated 1953, are apparent from one
of the most recent Utah cases involving Article VI of the
Utah Constitution where this Court said:
"One of the principal merits of our system of
law and justice is that it does not function by casting reason aside and clinging slavishly to a literal
application of one single provision of law to the
exclusion of all others. Its policy is rather to follow
the path of reason in order to avoid arbitrary and
unjust results and to give recognition in the highest
pos5ible degree to all of the rights assured by all of
the Constitutional provisions." Shields 11. Toronto,
16 U.2d 61. 63, 395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964).
The principle of allowing remuneration for legislators
serving on interim committees, such as the Joint Legal
Services Committee, in excess of that provided in the constitutional provisions covering compensation for legislators
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is well established. Where new and additional duties are imposed upon legislators by reason of their serving on such
committees, it is only logical that they should receive compensation for same. This obtains even though the particular constitutional limitation upon their comperisation is
couched in terms of denying their right to receive any other
compensation, pay, perquisite, or allowance, similar to Article VI, Section 9 of the U:tah Constitution as
existed
prior to January 1, 1951. State ex rel. James v. Aronson,
supra; Spearman v. Williams, ______ Okla. ______ , 415 P. 2d 597
( 1966). In the former case the Montana Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional under such constitutional limitation
a payment for actual travel and other expenses incurred by
a member of the new legiislative council created in that state.
These expenses had been provided for in the statute creating the council but were attacked as being in violation of
Article V, Section 5 of the Montana Constitution which
provided a per diem and mileage to each member of the
legislative assembly but stated that they " ... shall receive
no other compensation, perquisite, or allowance whatsoever." In the latter case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
came out to a similar result where members of that state's
legislative council were to receive certain lump sums each
month in lieu of expenses, this being in addition to the
compensation provicted for legislators in Article 5, Section
21 of the Oklahoma Constitution. This particul8.r constitutional provision ended with " ... and shall receive no other
compensation," and the court found such lump sums to be
constitutionai. Whi1e both of these c:;_,ses speak :in terms
of such payments not being additional compensation but
1
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rather reimbursement of actual cash outlays incurred for
serving on the particular legislative councils involved, implicit within the reasoning of both these courts is that the
members of the interim committees should receive same
modicum of remuneration for their additional services and
expenses. This is evident from State ex re,l Jrmies v. Aronson, supra, where the court refers with approval to language from a i)revious Montana case:
"It is a well-settled principle of law that a provision such as is contained in the Constitution of
this State, prohibiting any law diminishing the salary or emolument of a public officer after his election or appointment, does not forbid the allowance
of compensation for new and different services exacted from him during his term, where the statute
imposing the duties also prescribes the compensation for their performance." State ex rel. Donyes
v. Commissioners. 23 Mont. 250, 253, 58 Pac. 439,
440 (1899).
With Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution
having been amended to delete the prohibition against a
legislator receiving any additional pay or perquisite, there
is an even stronger case for declaring the payments provided for in Section 36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to
be valid. Thus, the appellant respectfully submits that the
payments provided for in Section 36-8-6 are constitutional
under Article VI, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution as it
existed when Section 36-8-6 was enacted in 1967.
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CONCLUSION
By way of summary then, Section 36-8-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is valid and not in violation of either Section 7 or 9 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution for the
following reasons:
1. There is a strong presumption as to the constitutionality of such legislation, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of same.
2. A legislator appointed to the Joint Legal Services

Committee is not appointed to a "civil office of profit" as
contemplated by Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution in that the requisites of such civil office simply cannot be met by the members of this Committee.
3. Section 36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, did not

increase the compensation of legislators appointed to the
Joint Legal Services Committee in violation of Article VI,
Section 9, of the Utah Constitution by reason of the fact
that this particular section of the Utah Construction limits
only the compensation that legislators are to receive for
work performed during legislative sessions and does not
in·ohibit remuneration to legislators in respect to new and
additional duties imposed on th2m by reason of r1embership of an interim legislative committee like the Joint
Legal Services Committee.
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On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the lower court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
MELVIN E. LESLIE
Assistant Attorney General
318 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for the Appellants

